Is Natural Law Just Fancy Egoism?

Mmm... not quite.

That depends.¹

If, by egoism, one means that the principles or standards of morality, according to natural law, are in some sense intrinsic or internal to us, then sure—that’s obviously true.

But if one is saying that this somehow means the satisfaction of any mere desire contributes to our flourishing, that is obviously false. Which is just another way of denying the idea that the standards of morality are set by our contingent wants, preferences, or passing fancies.²

No—for the natural law theorist distinguishes between natural desires (call those needs)³ and acquired desires (call those wants) and makes the following claim:

We ought to seek what is really good for us—the goods determined by our nature (our actual needs), which we cannot alter—and pursue acquired desires only when they are innocuous, meaning they do not interfere with our attainment of real goods.⁴

This is not a claim egoists can generally make, because they lack the theoretical (metaphysical/philosophical-anthropological) resources to distinguish between natural and acquired desires, real and apparent goods.

Update: I have seen concerns raised about natural law being egoistic because it is still fundamentally “selfish”—that is, morality being grounded in or guided by what is good for us as individual moral actors.

My brief response—partly to deny and partly to embrace this claim—is as follows:

“Selfish” often carries a negative connotation, so I’d instead use the term self-interest. But why assume morality shouldn’t involve our best self-interest? (I’d argue that it should!) The common concern, I take it, is that self-interest conflicts with the interests of others (and/or does not allow for genuine sacrifice)—but this is precisely the problem that natural law avoids by distinguishing between natural and acquired desires. Since our flourishing, as the kinds of beings we are, is inherently tied to social goods, justice, and the willingness to sacrifice contingent desires for objective goods, there is no inherent opposition between what is ultimately good for us and what is ultimately good for others.

This, to me, is actually the ideal moral framework: one in which the good to do (not just the good to have or the good to be) benefits both the moral agent and the broader moral community. A *truly* problematic moral system would be one that either demanded we act in ways that ultimately undermine our flourishing for the sake of others or, conversely, required us to pursue goods for ourselves at the genuine expense or harm of others. Natural law avoids these extremes by recognizing that individual good and the common good are fundamentally and necessarily linked. Even self-sacrifice, when required, is not ultimately a negation of self-interest (objective flourishing) but rather its fulfillment, since virtue and participation in the good are essential to human flourishing. At the same time, it remains a genuine sacrifice, insofar as it involves giving up a genuine desire of the heart—something morality, according to natural law, not infrequently demands.

That said, for a beautiful account of how God seeks to align or harmonize the desires of our heart with our objective ultimate good, see Eleonore Stump’s Wandering In Darkness.

1. Egoism—very broadly—is the thesis that self-interest is somehow the foundation of morality. Some forms of egoism are descriptive, like psychological egoism, which claims that people always act out of self-interest. Other forms are prescriptive, like ethical egoism, which argues that people ought to act out of self-interest, claiming that self-benefit (whatever that means) is the standard of morality.

Now, in one sense, natural law certainly is about acting in one’s self-interest—but again, the distinctions are critical. Natural law holds that we ought to act according to the dictates of our human nature—and that, ultimately, this is in our true self-interest, because it is what causes us to flourish as the kind of beings we are.

However, this does not mean we should simply do whatever we want, no matter how badly we want it at the time. And that, in practice, is where a major difference lies:

• Many egoists may be hedonists, treating self-interest as whatever maximizes pleasure, whereas the natural law theorist definitely isn’t.

• Egoism may also result in subjectivism—where moral rightness depends on personal preference (contingent or acquired desires)—whereas natural law definitely does not. In fact, our natural obligations often conflict with what we strongly desire in the moment.

2. Though, of course, it’s hard to call these “standards” of morality, since individual preferences and fancies vary wildly—hence the tendency of egoism to slide toward subjectivism. Traditional natural law, by contrast, does not—at least not if subjectivism means morality is dictated by personal whims. If, however, subjectivism simply means that moral standards are in the subject in some sense, then that is true but somewhat trivial, since all humans share the same moral standards by virtue of having the same human nature.

3. These are also natural necessities; could not have been otherwise.

4. Indeed, I make this very claim and build upon it in The Best Argument for God.