Look, Belief in God Is Reasonable—And That's Plenty

It is my opinion (which is what you’re here for, right?) that while very few arguments for God qualify as strict philosophical proofs—that is, arguments that deliver a true conclusion through premises that are rationally decidable by the usual methods of philosophy—quite a number of arguments for God nonetheless warrant reasonable belief in God.¹ The idea here is that even if such arguments do not compel assent or preclude reasonable disagreement, the premises supporting the conclusion are themselves perfectly reasonable to believe.

Of course, this discussion would mean very little if I didn’t say something about what I mean by reasonable. At a minimum, I take it to mean that no obvious norms of rationality are being violated—which, I realize, may sound more helpful than it actually is. So, to say a little more, let’s assert that a belief is reasonable just insofar as it is epistemically permissible to hold given one’s background knowledge, cognitive faculties, and the evidence (broadly construed) available to them, even if—and when—others of equal intelligence or expertise disagree.

This, I take it, is different from rational compulsion (if such a thing even exists), where rejecting a position would entail outright irrationality. Most obviously—but not exclusively—this would apply when someone violates basic logical or foundational principles of rationality, such as the principle of non-contradiction.²

In the context of an argument, then, assessing whether it warrants reasonable belief in its conclusion involves considerations like these: structural validity (no glaring fallacies), premises that have solid rational or evidential support (even if not universally accepted) and lack clear defeaters of equal weight, and coherence or fit within a broader philosophical system.

Finally, before we move on, let’s note that I’m not saying anything super-duper controversial here—many philosophically informed atheists would happily grant everything I’ve said so far. They’d just also want to say something similar about atheism—that it too can be a reasonable position to hold. (And what makes these atheists philosophically informed, you ask, as opposed to, say, unwashed savages? Well, the fact that they agree with me, obviously!)

Anyway.

Take the ever-popular Kalam cosmological argument—an argument I don’t typically have much to say about—which stitches together two commitments: (1) nothing begins without a cause, and (2) the universe (physical reality) began to exist.³ From these, it concludes that something beyond physical reality—a transcendent, immaterial entity of enormous power (reasonable inference to God there)—produced it. If anything is reasonable to believe, surely it’s the idea that from nothing comes nothing. In fact, this is one of those rare cases where I think it’s actually unreasonable to believe the opposite. Which means, of course, that some philosophers and scientists—often by engaging in heavy equivocations about "nothing"—have attempted to suggest otherwise. Is that really surprising? No, lol. Philosophers have long tried to be clever in defending what is obviously unreasonable, and many are, in fact, quite good at it—sometimes even convincing!

The real debate, I think, concerns whether space-time reality had a beginning. But again, if we’re asking whether it’s at least reasonable to believe this premise, the answer seems to be an easy yes. Not only is it not obviously contradicted by contemporary cosmology, but there’s actually a fair amount of astrophysical and cosmological evidence supporting it—redshift data, the second law of thermodynamics, the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin (BVG) theorem, and more. None of this outright proves a beginning—which is why skepticism toward the Kalam is not completely without merit—but it certainly makes it a rational stance to hold. (Now, I fully acknowledge that there are speculative models—eternal inflation, oscillating universes, the no-boundary proposal, and others—that attempt to avoid a definite beginning. But I see no compelling reason why anyone must rationally accept them. And from my understanding, each of these models faces significant theoretical challenges or, upon closer scrutiny, still implies a finite past.)

Then there are the philosophical arguments, particularly the growing interest in causal finitism—the idea that no single effect can be preceded by an infinite chain of causes. The debate here is intricate, to be sure, but when one really dives into it, it’s hard to see how one wouldn’t come away at least reasonably endorsing causal finitism, given the weight of the arguments (Grim Reaper paradoxes and others), even if they weren’t convinced it could be definitively established. And if causal finitism is reasonable to accept, then, within the context of the Kalam, belief in a transcendent creator of the universe follows as at least a reasonable position—even if not outright compelling.

So, yeah. Or something like that.

Naturally, I could tell a similar story about a whole bunch of other arguments for God. Fine-tuning would be another good example. Here, I think, is the easiest way to think about it: We have a pretty strong (to say the least) intuition that things which seem well put together—orderly, finely arranged, functionally precise—are designed by something with an intellect. This intuition is strongly supported pretty much everywhere we look.

However, evolutionary theory came along and seemed to challenge this intuition, allegedly showing that highly complex and elegantly structured organisms could arise from purely undirected natural processes. But then… we discovered that the very physical setup of our universe—the fundamental conditions that allow evolutionary processes to occur at all—itself appears exquisitely well-arranged, or "fine-tuned," as it is commonly called. So what initially seemed to undercut our intuition of design is now itself undercut (in its ability to undercut, that is) by the realization that reality—physical reality, anyway—appears well-ordered all the way down.⁴

So, is it unreasonable to think that something put it all together? That is, that there is some intelligent cause responsible for the fine-tuning of physical reality—a necessary condition (for all we know) for the emergence of beings like us? Certainly, I don’t think so!

(Of course, I’m hugely glossing over the many complexities of this debate—though, if one wants to dig deeper, they can consult my book—but I stand by my original claim: even once one wades into these complexities, it’s very difficult to argue that the fine-tuning argument doesn’t at least make theistic belief reasonable, even if it doesn’t outright disprove atheism.)

Shoot, I even think certain moral arguments make theistic belief quite reasonable—which, I realize, isn’t exactly a fashionable stance these days, given the current trajectory of the apologetic hivemind. The memo, after all, tells us that moral arguments are so last season. But if only because it’s not at all crazy to think that the inner logic of naturalism, as it were, tends toward anti-realism, whereas a broad Aristotelianism—one that provides the metaphysical resources for an objective moral order—fits rather naturally with traditional (classical) theism. Given those considerations, it would be tough to convince me (though, admittedly, I can be stubborn) that theistic belief isn’t, all else being equal, at least a reasonable theoretical option.

Now, I fully acknowledge naturalistic attempts at securing objective moral truths and knowledge—not only that, but I engage with what I consider the best of them in (ahem) my book. But even granting some initial plausibility to these efforts wouldn’t be enough to disqualify moral arguments as making theistic belief reasonable, I don’t think. After all, one could just as well argue that theism provides a better—and maybe even a simpler—overall explanation of the relevant moral data, thus taking a more abductive approach.

What’s the point of all this?⁵

Several, I suppose.

First, that reasonable belief is not all that difficult to come by. Metaphysical proofs, on the other hand, are a much taller order.

Second, for most people, reasonable belief is perfectly sufficient. The majority of us do not require (if only because we cannot acquire) airtight metaphysical demonstrations to live our lives according to beliefs that are hugely significant—and sometimes hugely precious. More often than not, we just need to know that what we believe, insofar as it shapes our attitudes and actions, isn’t an obviously lunatic notion.

Belief in God is obviously significant. Matthew Adelstein (

Bentham's Bulldog

) recently argued that it is the best of all possible news—and that it’s not unreasonable to think there is more going on here than mere wishful thinking. This sentiment, of course, has long been held by both believers and non-believers alike, and it’s one that I generally share.

For many, all they need is a basis for reasonable belief to conform to a certain course of action. I can tell you from personal experience that this was the case for me. Prior to my conversion, I couldn’t take religion or religious practices seriously, not because I lacked attraction to them, but because I didn’t think I had a reasonable basis for them. Once I came to see that reasonable basis, I felt free to pursue—or at least explore—what I already found attractive.

I know many others who are like me—people who want to explore something that could have a profoundly positive impact on their lives but feel they simply can’t unless they see it as reasonable. And I’m telling you that, at least when it comes to belief in God—and indeed Christianity in general—it is absolutely reasonable to do so (or, at the very least, it can be made reasonable).

In other words, if anything I’ve said here has merit, then something like Pascal’s Wager kicks in. If a particular religious way of life—say, the Christian way of life—is not obviously unreasonable, and (I would argue) at least as reasonable an option as any other, and if the potential benefits of pursuing it (both natural and supernatural) are substantial, then why not give it a shot?

And to be clear, this isn’t about "faking belief." It’s about taking an honest approach to religious seeking—reading the Bible, engaging in religious community, praying (if only the agnostics prayer⁶), and yeah, genuinely testing the waters. Worst case? You learn something interesting, maybe walk away with a few new friends. But I’d be willing to bet—how much, five bucks? Sure—that it could lead to something far greater than that.

I’ve seen it happen, you know.

1. And somewhat ironically, I think the arguments for God that are the strongest—the ones with the best shot at being genuine philosophical proofs—are probably the most abstract and least likely to actually persuade people. I’ll just assert—without backing it up for now—that when properly understood, it takes some serious silliness to get out of them.

2. Though of course in practice it is very hard to deliver something rationally compelling, since someone can almost always alter one of their commitments to avoid such violations.

3. In it’s most basic statement:

• Premise 1: Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

• Premise 2: The universe began to exist.

• Conclusion: Therefore, the universe has a cause.

4. Naturally, I think it would be a problem if God had parts that appeared well put together, thus indicator a divine-designer. (See this post). Hence why I affirm divine simplicity.

5. But wait: What about the problem of evil? What about it? Ah, yes—the distribution lines of evil and suffering in our actual world. Does that make it reasonable not to believe in God? From a certain epistemic perspective, yeah, I think I should probably say yes—so, sure, I’ll say it. But I’ll also say that, from another perspective—one operating under different assumptions, background knowledge, and interpretive frameworks—one can just as well be reasonable in affirming theism despite (or even in light of) these very same facts about the world.

Some might take this to mean that my standard for reasonableness is, well, a little cheap. And honestly? That might not be an entirely unfair takeaway.

6. “God, if there is a God, save my soul, if I have a soul.”