Two Problems for Molinism
Dr. Craig chats with Michael Lofton about Molinism.
Two concerns I have with Molinism.
The first is metaphysical, and here I will just report the problem but not pursue it. In short, the Molinist appears to put something beyond the divine universal causality, some positive act that does not have God as the primary first cause. Lonergan described Molinism as a four lane salvific highway: God’s yes or no, and our yes or no. He described Calvinism as a two lane highway: God’s yes or no — that’s it. Obviously, Lonergan thinks the correct position is the Thomistic one, which is three lane: God’s yes or no, and our no. From Lonergan’s perspective, Molinism violates divine aseity and universal causality, Calvinism violates divine goodness and innocence. Only the Thomistic three-lane highway (where God offers sufficient grace for all to say yes, yet it remains possible for us to say no) can get around both issues. We’ll save that for another post.
My other concern relates to the problem of evil, or more specifically the doctrine of Hell. For while Molinism may appear to provide a better solution than Calvinism for preserving divine innocence, I fear the solution is superficial. Molinism does not fare much better than Calvinism at the end of the day, and here’s why: Assuming there are people in Hell, the Molinist must admit that 1) God created somebody knowing they would go to Hell and 2) God almost certainly could have created a circumstance where that person did not go to Hell. Now, even if we concede there is no possible world with any significant number of people where no one goes to Hell, surely there were different arrangements available to God where this or that specific person did not go to Hell.1 Thus, there appears to be a certain arbitrariness and (cruel?) indifference toward individuals from the Molinist perspective — a sort of cosmic utilitarianism at the end of the day, where some individual may be permitted to go to Hell just so long as that arrangement where they are damned is one where more people overall are saved, or something like that. When the Molinist is pressed with this objection, they frequently assert we have no right to tell God what to do or who God must save. But doesn’t that sound familiar? To my ears, that hardly rings any different than the usual Calvinist response.
PS - A quick note about the podcast. When Dr. Craig speaks about Aquinas’s position on free will (about the 24 minute mark), he is incorrect or at least he is not upfront about how contentious this perspective is among Thomists. The Thomist position I maintain is that — yes — God causes our free choice, but God does not unilaterally determine our choice. While SOME Thomists may say this, definitely not all Thomists say this. In fact, Eleonore Stump argue vehemently against this view, as not only incorrect, but not what Aquinas teaches. She maintains, as a Thomist, that God acts on the will via formal causality only, and cannot unliterally determine our choice. I cannot pursue this thesis in detail here, but the interested reader should see Stump’s Aquinas for details.
The Thomist does not face this problem, since God does not know what anybody would freely choose BEFORE any choice is made, since (contrary to the Molinist claim of God having middle knowledge), there is nothing to be known.