Should We Want God to Exist?

There is a growing literature within the axiology of theism—essentially, the question of whether we should want God to exist, or if the world is somehow better for God existing. Honestly, I think a lot of people, even atheists, would intuitively answer "yes" and move on; nevertheless, anything that can be debated will be debated in philosophy, and the conversation around this topic is somewhat interesting.¹

For instance, I just read an article (and hope to interview the author soon) in which the author argues that the existence of God makes the problem of evil more manageable/hopeful. His reasoning, as you might anticipate, is that God’s existence makes it more likely that evils are not ultimately pointless, or if they are, that they are weakly rather than strongly pointless, while also increasing the likelihood that our world, overall, is at least a very good world, if not the best of all possible worlds.² Plus, afterlife, and… well, you know the drill.

Setting those considerations aside, I think this debate is another area where classical theists in particular—committed to divine simplicity, among other things—have something significant to contribute that, at least in my observation, hasn’t yet been fully articulated.

For example, on classical theism, God just is goodness itself, given the doctrine of simplicity. God doesn’t possess goodness, not even an unlimited amount—no, God simply is the paradigm of the good. In this sense, it’s almost existentially absurd to suggest that it would be better if God did not exist, as this is equivalent to saying it would be better if goodness did not exist. But, as Aristotle says, goodness is just that which all things desire. So this assertion effectively translates into desiring not to have that which all things desire—which seems nonsensical. And, indeed, I think it is nonsense—confused talk from someone who doesn’t understand what classical theism amounts to. (Of course, one may challenge classical theistic commitments on other grounds, including the idea that God just is The Good, but that’s another debate entirely. Assuming this picture is coherent, I think it has a significant bearing on the axiology of theism debate.)

Others object to the goodness of theism on the grounds that if God exists, we lose autonomy and privacy, two very significant goods, they claim. This objection takes various forms, but again, I think classical theism has something meaningful to say here. First, regarding autonomy, or agency in general, I have yet to find any metaphysical model that makes libertarian freedom plausible apart from classical theism. This is a point I discuss in my book. If God does not exist, determinism seems to follow inevitably (I think compatibilism, of a naturalistic sort, is just obviously false)—history simply passes through and determines us, rather than us (as metaphysically substantial agents) having any true determination upon history. Contrived moves could be made to avoid this, I suppose, but I find them all highly implausible. So, speaking metaphysically, I would argue that classical theism provides a solid foundation for real human agency (autonomy) and libertarian freedom, whereas various forms of naturalism or non-classical theism do not. For the metaphysics of this, see Matthew Grant’s excellent book, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality. Moreover, God clearly grants us broad boundaries to exercise our autonomy, guiding us in a way that aligns with our fallibly free nature. Thus, by my lights, if one values real agency, it seems definitely better if God exists!

As for privacy, I’m not entirely convinced it’s such a great good in itself—that is, absolutely speaking. We already recognize many relationships in which a certain lack of privacy is seen positively, even as essential—consider the relationship between parents and children, for example. If we have a right to privacy, it’s really a limited right against certain forms of intrusion, applying only in some relationships, not all. It’s not an invasion when a parent knows their child’s business; in many cases, it’s a duty. So, I think the classical theist can reasonably argue that we have no right to privacy in relation to God, meaning we’re not losing anything good by not having absolute privacy.

Furthermore, God’s intimacy with us is far from a “creepy Big Brother” type of surveillance; rather, The Good from which all our being derives is constantly causally present to us, enabling us to have thoughts—including free thoughts—in the first place. This strikes me as a radically different relationship from the objectionable Big Brother image some skeptics likely have in mind (due, as usual, to some crude anthropomorphic understanding of God). At the very least, there’s good reason to be skeptical that a lack of privacy in relation to God is any loss of real good if God (as classical theists understand Him) exists.

1. This claim is mildly evidenced by how often I hear atheists say, “As much as I wish God were real, I’m just not convinced by the evidence,” or something along those lines.

2. As the author puts it: An evil is weakly pointless if it doesn’t satisfy Rowe’s proviso—“God would allow some evil E only if E is necessary to secure a greater good or to prevent the occurrence of some evil that is worse than or just as bad as E”—but is still morally justified. An evil is strongly pointless if it neither satisfies Rowe’s proviso nor is morally justified in any way.