I am, whether I think or not...

On abortion and Cartesian dualism

From the editor of JAT: This guest post comes from Dr. Karlo Broussard.

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The late Mary Anne Warren argued that one of the earmarks for determining a human being to be a person is the attainment of “consciousness . . . and in particular the capacity to feel pain.”

This is a common tactic that pro-abortion advocates take to elude pro-life arguments for the immorality of abortion. If a human being before the stage of consciousness (roughly before 24 weeks) isn’t a human person, so it’s argued, then it’s morally licit to kill it without any moral repercussions.

But Warren’s counter is only as good as its assumptions.

Notice Warren assumes the physical organism that we call a human being can be distinct from a human person—the rational being. This way of thinking is not unprecedented. It has its roots in the writings of Plato and became predominant in modern philosophy with the writings of the seventeenth century French philosopher Renes Descartes.

Descartes made this view so popular that it is now known by his name: Cartesian dualism. Descartes taught that the human being is divided into two separate substances: a mental substance (the soul—res cogitans) and a corporeal substance (the body—res extensa).

For Descartes, the substance that constitutes who you are as a person is the res cogitans—“the thinking self.” And rather than the body being essential to a person’s identity, as understood in the views of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, it is merely accidental (not belonging to the essence). For Descartes the body is merely a machine in which the soul exists as a ghost; hence the phrase “a ghost in a machine.”

It's not difficult to see how Warren’s view of the human being smacks of Cartesian dualism. What she calls a human being, or the living physical organism before the attainment of consciousness, is Descartes’ res extensa—the body. And this is distinct from what she calls a human person, which is Descartes’ res cogitans—the rational substance. For this reason, let’s call Warren’s hidden assumption “the Cartesian assumption.”

Warren’s claim, therefore, is true if and only if the Cartesian assumption is true—that a living human organism (called a human being) can be distinct from a human person. Consequently, if the Cartesian assumption is false, then it would be impossible for a human being not to be a human person—that’s to say, every human being, no matter the stage of development, would be a human person. And if that’s true, then it would never be morally licit to kill the unborn.

Our task before us, then, is to show why the Cartesian assumption is false. Unfortunately, to do that we must dive into some deep philosophical waters. So, bear with me!

Here’s our starting point: the principle that makes the currently existing living organism (pointing to a human being) a rational substance (a person) is identical to the principle that makes this currently existing living organism (again, pointing to a human being) a living organism—i.e., living matter.

(I take it that all on both sides of this debate agree that rationality constitutes personhood).

So, why should we think the above claim is true?

I’m sure you’d agree with me that there’s a difference between living matter (a living organism), say, a tree, and nonliving matter, like a rock. And that there must be some differentiating factor—a principle by which the tree is living rather than not. If there’s nothing to make them different, then they would be the same, which is contrary to fact.

Now, the principle by which the living matter is living must be something other than matter; otherwise, the living matter (the tree) would be different than the nonliving matter (the rock) on account of that which they are the same—namely, matter. But that’s absurd. Two things can’t be different on account of that in virtue of which they are the same.

Let’s call this non-material differentiating factor a soul—that by which the tree is living matter (having an act of life) rather than nonliving matter (having no act of life).

Now, the tree’s act of living has wrapped up within it a variety of other acts or operations—that’s to say, insofar as the tree is alive it acts in certain ways and has certain powers. It sinks roots into the ground, grows upward toward light, sends branches out from its trunk—on which leaves grow, and it performs photosynthesis.

Since the tree’s soul is the principle that accounts for its act of life, and that act of life has wrapped within it these other actions given the kind of thing it is, it follows that the tree’s soul also is the principle for these other actions. In other words, the tree’s soul doesn’t merely account for the tree being alive but also all its other treeish operations.

What about a human being?

Human beings are living organisms as well. Therefore, humans must have a soul—a principle by which they are living matter and not nonliving matter.

And like the tree, humans have an act of life that has wrapped up within it a variety of other actions. Some are had in common with the tree, such as taking in nutrients and growth. The powers that enable humans to perform these actions are called vegetative powers.

Unlike the tree, humans see, hear, and taste, which means humans are sentient, or animals. The powers that enable humans to perform these actions are called sensitive powers.

A human, at least in the more mature stages of development, also engage in thought processes that are conceptual in nature (reasoning) and freely choose some goods over others. The powers that enable humans to perform these actions are intellect and will— called rational powers.

Since a human’s soul is the principle that accounts for its act of living, and that act of life necessarily involves other actions that go with being human (growing, sensing, and reasoning), along with the powers from which these acts proceed (vegetative, sensitive, and rational), it follows that the human’s soul is also the principle that accounts for these actions that go with being human, along with the powers from which these acts proceed.

In other words, a human’s soul is the principle that accounts for it being the living organism that it is (with its vegetative powers and actions) and at the same time the principle that accounts for it being an animal with a rational nature (with its sentient powers and actions and its rational powers and actions)—that’s to say, a person.

So, our claim above is true: the principle that makes this currently existing living organism (pointing to a human being) a rational substance (a person) is identical to the principle that makes this currently existing living organism (again, pointing to a human being) a living organism.

Now, the principle that currently makes a human a living organism, his soul, was present the moment the human was conceived, since, as science confirms, from the moment of conception a human is a living organism. If a human’s soul accounts for it being a living human organism now, and science tells us a human was a living organism from the moment of its conception, then it follows that a human’s soul was present from the moment of its conception. In fact, it’s the overwhelming scientific testimony for the presence of a living human organism from the moment of conception that leads pro-abortion advocates to make a Warren-type argument in the first place (they can’t deny it’s a human being).

We now can begin to connect the dots.

Given what we said above, a human’s soul simultaneously makes it both a living human organism and a rational substance—that’s to say, a person. That very soul is present from the moment of a human’s conception. Therefore, from the moment of a human’s conception, a human isn’t merely a living organism but a living organism of a rational nature—with rational powers and the potential to engage in rational activities at later stages of development. In short, a human being is a human person from the moment of conception.

What this means is that Warren’s Cartesian assumption is false. Recall, the Cartesian assumption asserts that a living human organism can be distinct from a human person. But we’ve just shown this is impossible. Therefore, a human being, no matter the stage of development, is a human person.

And if a human being is a human person no matter the stage of development, then it’s never morally licit to kill the unborn.

What’s real? Who are persons? Check out these other two similar articles for more!