So, there is a kind of likeness between our rational nature and God, especially in grasping first principles which are self-evident and immediately known (unmediated by other propositions). There is something divine-like in the mind's ability to grasp something as true by the very act of understanding it. At the foundations of our knowledge are simple acts of immediate inference. This also calls to mind Gödel's own insights around incompleteness, where the mind can apprehend the truth of the G-sentence apart from any formal deductive system. Just some thoughts!
This, I think, is where proponents of proper functionalism should talk more with those who are still engaged in the metaphysics of knowledge, since (as I hinted in the post) PF really only ranges over acts of judgment (composition/division), aka propositional knowledge; it surely isn't an account of knowledge across the board since it doesn't have much if anything to say about those foundational acts you're talking about (simple apprehension).
I would love to read more articles on your views on epistemology. You've already mentioned the importance of intuition in your epistemological views several times, but this one far surpasses the previous ones!
I have to admit that I don't have a clue about a lot of what you are trying to say.
If we intuit that certain things are true, then if they are essential enough, we can test them for their truth. One way to approach simple things is to ask others if they believe something is true and why. This transforms a JTB into knowledge.
Two, we can test them for reasonableness. For example, I am certainly not alone in a make-believe world of idealism because I am not smart enough to create Shakespeare, Einstein, and so on.
Aside: what is classical theism? You write, which I am not exactly sure what it means (This brings me back to one of my more basic cases for classical theism, which is that—to my mind-it seems the worldview best suited to make sense of our strongest intuitions. What I mean is that, all along the chain of my classically theistic commitments, I detect no obvious weak link that would compel me to cast serious doubt on any of my more phenomenologically forceful seemings)
For example, I disagree with Aquinas and believe that evil has nothing to do with proving the existence of a creator. It may have something to do with the characteristics of this creator, but not that there was a creation itself. So I believe any atheist using it is not really making a case for atheism but has agreed to a theistic argument for a creator. Does that make me against classical theism?
Also, I do not believe atheism explains the current world/universe because the implications of it are incredibly absurd so it is anything but simpler. Therefore believe in theism. (added)
Surely some of what we intuit to be obviously the case is not really testable—for example, brain in bat scenarios—but also deeper principles (logical, say) upon which the intelligently of such tests would simply have to assume.
Nor do I think we should always have to give an account of what we believe in order to say what we believe is something we know.
It seems that classical theism has more to do with the characteristics or nature of the creator, as opposed to whether there was a creation or creator in the first place. As far as I know, I don't disagree with you on anything in this area.
It's a little more than that, thought it definitely includes that. Classical theism is really itself an entire metaphysical program, a program which ultimately informs us not just about the existence of God but the characteristics as well.
But the existence of a creator is as simple as 123. Therefore, it does not seem to be a significant issue. This is why I maintain any discussion for a rationale of atheism/agnosticism is foolish and essentially a waste of time.
However, the discerning of the characteristics of this creator is quite a different story. It is where the listing of the nature of the creator is the only issue. Eventually, you will get to the Christian God as the only description that makes sense.
You define classical theism here in one of your 60 secondish videos:
I use the word "creator" here because the entity that created existence is at first far from being shown to be "God" with an upper case "G." It seems that most of classical theism is moving from the obvious fact that there is a creator to a complete description of this entity so that we can call it a God with an upper case G.
Now, the existence of a creator is as simple as 123. I have not seen anything in evidence or logic to contradict this obviousness. The absurdity of infinite regress rules out atheism, and so on, which leaves only the popping out of nowhere by an entity that can create.
So, there is a kind of likeness between our rational nature and God, especially in grasping first principles which are self-evident and immediately known (unmediated by other propositions). There is something divine-like in the mind's ability to grasp something as true by the very act of understanding it. At the foundations of our knowledge are simple acts of immediate inference. This also calls to mind Gödel's own insights around incompleteness, where the mind can apprehend the truth of the G-sentence apart from any formal deductive system. Just some thoughts!
This, I think, is where proponents of proper functionalism should talk more with those who are still engaged in the metaphysics of knowledge, since (as I hinted in the post) PF really only ranges over acts of judgment (composition/division), aka propositional knowledge; it surely isn't an account of knowledge across the board since it doesn't have much if anything to say about those foundational acts you're talking about (simple apprehension).
This is an excellent article!
I would love to read more articles on your views on epistemology. You've already mentioned the importance of intuition in your epistemological views several times, but this one far surpasses the previous ones!
I will definitely consider it. Thank you!
I have to admit that I don't have a clue about a lot of what you are trying to say.
If we intuit that certain things are true, then if they are essential enough, we can test them for their truth. One way to approach simple things is to ask others if they believe something is true and why. This transforms a JTB into knowledge.
Two, we can test them for reasonableness. For example, I am certainly not alone in a make-believe world of idealism because I am not smart enough to create Shakespeare, Einstein, and so on.
Aside: what is classical theism? You write, which I am not exactly sure what it means (This brings me back to one of my more basic cases for classical theism, which is that—to my mind-it seems the worldview best suited to make sense of our strongest intuitions. What I mean is that, all along the chain of my classically theistic commitments, I detect no obvious weak link that would compel me to cast serious doubt on any of my more phenomenologically forceful seemings)
For example, I disagree with Aquinas and believe that evil has nothing to do with proving the existence of a creator. It may have something to do with the characteristics of this creator, but not that there was a creation itself. So I believe any atheist using it is not really making a case for atheism but has agreed to a theistic argument for a creator. Does that make me against classical theism?
Also, I do not believe atheism explains the current world/universe because the implications of it are incredibly absurd so it is anything but simpler. Therefore believe in theism. (added)
Hi Jerry,
Surely some of what we intuit to be obviously the case is not really testable—for example, brain in bat scenarios—but also deeper principles (logical, say) upon which the intelligently of such tests would simply have to assume.
Nor do I think we should always have to give an account of what we believe in order to say what we believe is something we know.
Next: You ask what classical theism is—I have a post on this; several in fact. Here’s one to start with: https://open.substack.com/pub/journalofabsolutetruth/p/why-classical-theism-isnt-just-about?r=q941p&utm_medium=ios
Finally, you can disagree with Aquinas about many things and remain a classical theist—just not many things concerning his actual philosophy of God.
It seems that classical theism has more to do with the characteristics or nature of the creator, as opposed to whether there was a creation or creator in the first place. As far as I know, I don't disagree with you on anything in this area.
It's a little more than that, thought it definitely includes that. Classical theism is really itself an entire metaphysical program, a program which ultimately informs us not just about the existence of God but the characteristics as well.
But the existence of a creator is as simple as 123. Therefore, it does not seem to be a significant issue. This is why I maintain any discussion for a rationale of atheism/agnosticism is foolish and essentially a waste of time.
However, the discerning of the characteristics of this creator is quite a different story. It is where the listing of the nature of the creator is the only issue. Eventually, you will get to the Christian God as the only description that makes sense.
You define classical theism here in one of your 60 secondish videos:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4HizSFYazOQ In it you pay almost no attention to proofs of a creator.
I use the word "creator" here because the entity that created existence is at first far from being shown to be "God" with an upper case "G." It seems that most of classical theism is moving from the obvious fact that there is a creator to a complete description of this entity so that we can call it a God with an upper case G.
Now, the existence of a creator is as simple as 123. I have not seen anything in evidence or logic to contradict this obviousness. The absurdity of infinite regress rules out atheism, and so on, which leaves only the popping out of nowhere by an entity that can create.