Can the Atheist Reverse the Reversal?
Somebody sent the following screenshot in response to my recent post with Catholic Answers, which is responding to the cumulative case apologetic for atheism. It is fitting that the screenshot is from the work of Paul Draper, since he is one of the atheists I had in mind in writing this series. Obviously, this is far from a complete account — and Draper isn’t responding specifically to me, of course — but nevertheless, let’s have a look to see if the objections can be sustained. (That is, whether the atheist can reverse my reversal regarding evidential weight.)
We’ll take these points out of order.
Regarding fine-tuning and the prevalence of life, why should anybody be confident in Draper’s assertion? Frankly (it seems to me), Draper begs a barrel of questions while attempting divine psychoanalysis. Fine-tuning obviously points to – as Draper admits – transcendent intelligence, even if it does not definitively prove it. But what EXACTLY that transcendent intelligence is aiming for is not something we can specify with any significant confidence on generic theism: whether God aims for a universe teeming with life or just some very limited form of life, theism accommodates both possibilities, and any in between, with ease. Draper’s rebuttal here is weaker than wet macaroni.
Think about it. Do you see any strong logic-based reason that God would make the universe teeming with life, especially since (for all we know) God may have made OTHER universes teeming with life and many (perhaps infinitely many) in between? Here is my honest response: I cannot see this expectation at all. As I must remind others and myself: focus on what is clear, not what is unclear. It is clear fine-tuning counts strongly toward theism; it is not clear that the level of life in this universe counts away from theism.
Returning to the point about consciousness, this is a significant concession from Draper, as well. In response, however, Draper again begs questions while ignoring the fact that the hylemorphist is going to cheerily accept Draper’s point about the deep interconnectedness between mental and physical phenomena and use them in their favor. At worst, the theistic hylemorphist and naturalist draw in this respect – that is, make similar predictions – about mind-body relational dependency (notice, however, that dependent upon =/= reducible to). But that is being too concessionary, actually, since contemporary neurological research increasingly shows just how much the mind affects the brain/body as the brain/body affects the mind (which is better expected given a network of formal causality, which the hylemorphist endorses, than what we would expect on naturalism).1 However, since consciousness is vastly more probable on theism, this should — other considerations equal — push one to be a theistic hylemorphist to better accommodate our total understanding, especially if they feel Draper has scored points against the substance dualist. Unfortunately, Draper seems only to have substance dualists in mind, ignoring that for much of philosophical history classical theists were not that (though this is not surprising given that Draper is engaged in a long academic desk struggle against Richard Swinburne, a prominent substance dualist). Finally, Draper seems to be ignorant of the very credible evidence given by near death experiences, which is obviously something that would never be reasonably expected if naturalism were true.2 Again, a significant point score for theism in relation to consciousness, and one perfectly compatible with various hylemorphic accounts, though equally compatible with substance dualism.
It should also be mentioned – though this wouldn’t be fair to Draper since he’s not responding to my article, but it’s worth pointing out to those that kick off Draper’s paper in response to mine – that I referenced deductive arguments against physicalism/naturalism from rationality (Feser and Ross), which will in principle override any otherwise evidential case until they those arguments are adequately dealt with. These considerations apply equally to moral agency – which itself is contingent upon, not just consciousness, but rationality – so again Draper’s objections as reasserted by his enthusiastic social media followers would be question begging in this respect.
In short, Draper tries to salvage the naturalism from the cumulative-theistic case by indicating how a deeper-broader analysis of the facts favors atheisms; of course, I maintain it is precisely the opposite on virtually, if not literally, every point, as I’ve argued throughout my series with Catholic Answers.
Finally, as I’ve argued in previous posts, to boost naturalism to the point of being as explanatorily fruitful as theism (which it can never in principle be, since naturalism can never adequately explain why Nature exists; only pure actuality can) it must strap itself with increasing amounts of (increasingly ad hoc) complexity, which at that point renders naturalism not only implausible but uninteresting.
See, for example, The Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the Soul - https://amzn.to/3EsDDL5
See Spitzer’s The Soul’s Upward Yearning for a nice summary of the peer-reviewed research - https://amzn.to/31clWkP