Can Moral Data Be Disabled?
Maybe, but does it need to be?
I suggest that metaphysical data encompasses any broad feature of reality that we have reason to believe is actually real at the beginning of our investigation. Examples include contingency, change, consciousness, stability/order, freedom, and morality. Such data typically arise from common sense, common experience, or both.
Before attempting to explain this data, we must first consider whether any of it can be disabled and if it should be. This involves examining whether there are reasons to think the data is "merely pretend," meaning there are grounds for denying its reality as commonly perceived. These reasons for disablement must be stronger than the initial reasons for accepting the data.
I claim we have good reason at the start of metaphysical investigation to accept stance-independent moral facts, represented by true moral claims such as "it is wrong to humiliate old women just for fun." This data is derived from common sense and common experience, frequently evident in moral thought and discourse.
Error theorists, committed to moral nihilism, must disable this data to maintain their theory's viability—obviously. They typically do so by arguing that such moral facts would be intolerably queer, or by citing moral disagreement or evolutionary theory.
Unfortunately for the error theorist, I don't believe these attempts are successful or even close. The queerness argument relies on highly substantive and controversial philosophical positions, while the other two empirical considerations, on their own, do not provide sufficient reason to dismiss the data. As Bengson, Cuneo, and Schafer-Landau point out, these considerations must be further specified and connected to other substantive (and controversial) philosophical and epistemological theses to be convincing.1 In other words, error theorists have a lot more work to do—and work I believe they are incapable of doing—if they want to effectively disable the data.
Moreover, if we already have a theory that can explain moral data elegantly, accommodate empirical considerations equally well, explain all other relevant metaphysical data, and provide an overall simple theory, then we should adopt that theory. This theory is classical theism.
Moral Universe, 61-62.
I have read this three times and still not sure what is being said. I do understand the very end in that classical theism provides a coherent morality.
Is this one philosopher talking to another? I don’t see how it is talking to the common person.
Nearly all alternative morality that is different from classical theism is power oriented. I could imagine some power countenancing the humiliation of old women or at least accepting it if it enhanced their power.
A indication that power rules - if one went to Tashkent, they could see a featured statue of Tamarlane who is credited with killing about 5% of the human population of the time. Mao and Stalin are still both celebrated in various parts of the world. Yet, both are mass murderers.
Aside: freedom was not part of the world till recently so including it in features of reality that we have reason to believe is actually real would seem at odds with traditional reality not a feature of it. Also classical theism did not recognize it.
In other words classical theism was mistaken about part of the world. Current theism recognizes the importance of freedom. I believe that freedom of humans is a built in aspect of the natural world but the Church did not see it that way as it adopted Plato’s view of the world that assigns most humans to inferior positions in this world. But once the English revolution of the 1600s espoused it to some extent, the western world gradually came to accept it and reluctantly parts of the rest of the world then adopted it.
A second aside: the modern world only emerged once freedom started to become more common in 17th century England. This led to the Industrial Revolution a century and half later first in England and then in its colonies. The epitome of this was Penn’s new world colony that invited tens of thousands of poor German farmers to come live in Pennsylvania. I told this to a table of Philadelphians yesterday and not one had heard it before but recognized it as true once they heard it. After all Germantown is a major section of Philadelphia (but no Germans live there anymore.)