Barry Miller's Approach to God
Rumor has it that I develop Barry Miller’s approach to God in my upcoming book with Sophia. This rumor is false. The Millerian argument is far too complex (most especially the metaphysical underpinnings1) for the Sophia book, though I borrow several important insights from Miller in the cosmological argument I develop, which I take to be compatible with less controversial metaphysical starting points. However, I am currently working on an article length defense of Miller’s argument, as featured in his book From Existence to God.
For now, I’d like to briefly summarize (not defend) Miller’s philosophical approach to God, which Miller himself summarizes as follows,
“… I argue that there is indeed a hidden contradiction in claiming both that, say, Fido exists and that God does not. In fact, unless God were admitted to exits, there would be an implicit contradiction in just one of those conjuncts, viz., in the apparently innocuous claim that Fido exists. For just that reason, the question ‘How ever can it be that Fido does exist?’ is not one we are free to ignore: it is logically inescapable. If I am right, therefore, the contingency argument receives its impetus, not from the principle of sufficient reason or intelligibility as the baneful influence of Liebniz and Clarke has led many to accept, but from the need to square the truth of Fido’s existing with the companion truth that his existing could not be – logically could not be – a brute fact.”2
The advantages of Miller’s approach to God? For one thing, no upfront causal or explanatory principle is required. Just that innocently sweet principle of contradiction is all. For another thing, concerns of composition fallacy are avoided since the argument proceeds from just one contingent entity to subsistent existence (God); we do not need to aggregate all contingent entities together or anything like that. To my mind, these are significant advantages, since the most persistent objections to cosmological reasoning tend to call into question the causal or explanatory principles being deployed or that some sort of composition fallacy is happening. That Miller’s argument structurally sidesteps these issues entirely is pretty neat (though this isn’t to say it doesn’t have challenges of its own).
The basic thrust of Miller’s argument is this. Miller contends that upon substantial analysis, any contingent individual – for example, Thumper the rabbit (a pet rabbit of our acquaintance, not a fictional entity) – is either a contradictory structure or is caused to exist for as long as he exists. Said differently, when considered just in se, Thumper is a metaphysical composite of an existence (or is-ness) element and a Thumper (or what-ness) element. Thumper and his existence are constituents and thereby ontologically prior parts of existing Thumper.3 However, considered just in se, neither Thumper nor his existence can actually be ontologically prior parts of existing Thumper. So, we are ultimately led to holding two positions which are quite impossible to hold together: that Thumper and his existence must be yet cannot be parts of existing Thumper. The implication being that Thumper is an impossible existent. But this cannot be. After all, Thumper is right there, stealing carrots. And so, the contradiction must be merely apparent.
Why does Miller think that when considered just in se Thumper’s constituents cannot be constituents of existing Thumper? Simply because Thumper’s existence crucially requires Thumper for its completion (individuation, in other words; that is, to be the existence OF Thumper and not some other being), hence the ontological composition must have Thumper (the essence element) as its constructional starting point. The Thumper part, in other words, must first be available (has priority explanatorily even if not temporally) for Thumper’s existence to be a part. Said differently, the existence part requires the essence parts to be a part. But here’s the rub. The essence part, apart from the existence part, is literally nothing, and as such is not only not a part but cannot even have the capacity to be a part (qua nothing, it has no capacities or properties).
Miller’s resolution to the paradox is to argue that Thumper’s parts have their capacity to be parts neither in virtue of existing Thumper (the composite whole) nor his constituents (neither the Thumper element nor the existence element) but an extrinsic cause. This is what ultimately causes Miller to endorse a sentence that should be on everybody’s t-shirt if they want hot dates: No Non-Contradictory Non-Elliptical Construal of Atomic Sentences of The Form “A Exists”. Said differently, “Thumper exists” has contradictory implications unless “Thumper exists” is a suppressed proposition. Suppressed for what? Suppressed for something like “Thumper exists qua dependent upon A.” whatever A is.
There are ways to question this argument, of course. One concerns the notion of the priority of the essence elements in relation the existence element, which many Thomists will question. Surely the existence element has priority, they’ll say. Importantly, Miller does not disagree with this – that is, concerning a thing’s actuality. There, the existence element is prior. However, concerning a thing’s individuation or completion, the essence element is prior, and that is all that is required to get his argument up and running. Moreover, Miller’s position that the existence element has priority in one respect and the essence element has priority in another respect solves (or so he argues) some of the more persistent objections concerning the thick theory of existence, where existence is attributed to individuals (is a real property of concrete individuals).
OK, that’s enough for today. This summary is definitely inadequate, and does little to show the true depth and rigor of Miller’s thought on this matter. Nevertheless, I hope what has been written will entice my readers to give a look toward what I consider one of the more creative and convincing philosophical approaches to God.
For am explication and defense of these metaphysical underpinnings, see The Fullness of Being, 67-81.
From Existence to God, Preface.
Miller writes, “By ontological parts I shall not mean spatio-temporal parts, but categorical ones. Candidates for such parts would be substances, properties, relations, haecceities, the bare particulars of Bergmann, the tropes of D.C. Williams, the individuating operator of Castaneda, and so on. While mentioning these as candidates for being ontological parts, there are very few of them that I would endorse as being successful candidates.” From Existence to God, footnote 16, pg. 36.