To expand on previous comment, God is identical to his act of existence, knowledge and willing his own goodness by a single act. But he isn't identical to act of creation (which is with regard to outside of himself and this would apply to any act which has to do with things apart from him), that act would simply be contingent and created by God's power and brings forth some effects unlike his essential act with regard to himself.
Hi Pat. I have a question regarding God's act of creation.
As Aquinas says, God necessarily wills his own goodness and he freely wills things apart from himself on the account of his goodness. Now, act of creation is a contingent act willed freely by God. My question is that how it's possible for God to be identical to the contingent act of creation?
What I'm suggesting is that why don't we simply deny God is identical to his act of creation. We're only committed to say God is identical to his capacity to will, right? why would we make a contingent act with temporal effects identical to his essence (I know that the effects aren't identical to his essence, but the act itself is) and that's what I want to deny. God is identical to his ad-intra will (i.e. willing his goodness) but he isn't identical to ad-extra acts of willing which are contingent. This seems to solve and defeat any possible modal collapse argument much better than when we accept the second premise (2nd being God is identical to act of creation).
So to sum it up. Instead of denying 2nd premise, why would we accept it and then try to point out the fallacy in the argument? I don't see how Thomistic Simplicity makes you to affirm contingent acts being identical to God's essence. I hope I was clear enough.
To expand on previous comment, God is identical to his act of existence, knowledge and willing his own goodness by a single act. But he isn't identical to act of creation (which is with regard to outside of himself and this would apply to any act which has to do with things apart from him), that act would simply be contingent and created by God's power and brings forth some effects unlike his essential act with regard to himself.
1- God is identical to his capacity to act
2- God is identical to his act
3- God isn't identical to the effects of his act.
Let's just change the 2nd one:
1- God is identical to his capacity to act
2- God isn't identical to his act
3- God isn't identical to the effects of his act.
What would be the problem with this?
Hi Pat. I have a question regarding God's act of creation.
As Aquinas says, God necessarily wills his own goodness and he freely wills things apart from himself on the account of his goodness. Now, act of creation is a contingent act willed freely by God. My question is that how it's possible for God to be identical to the contingent act of creation?
What I'm suggesting is that why don't we simply deny God is identical to his act of creation. We're only committed to say God is identical to his capacity to will, right? why would we make a contingent act with temporal effects identical to his essence (I know that the effects aren't identical to his essence, but the act itself is) and that's what I want to deny. God is identical to his ad-intra will (i.e. willing his goodness) but he isn't identical to ad-extra acts of willing which are contingent. This seems to solve and defeat any possible modal collapse argument much better than when we accept the second premise (2nd being God is identical to act of creation).
So to sum it up. Instead of denying 2nd premise, why would we accept it and then try to point out the fallacy in the argument? I don't see how Thomistic Simplicity makes you to affirm contingent acts being identical to God's essence. I hope I was clear enough.