A Wild Theodicy You’ve Probably Never Considered

Here’s an outline of a theodicy that, while not one I personally endorse, is interesting to consider and might have potential in addressing most forms of the logical problem of evil.

Suppose Plato’s theory of pre-existence (of souls) is at least possible. I actually have a pretty clever argument for this. Ready? Here it goes:

Premise 1: If Plato—you know, the guy to whom all of philosophy is sometimes said to be a footnote—thought something wasn’t just possible but actual,
Conclusion: then you’re not a total idiot for thinking it might actually be possible.

Admittedly, some premises are suppressed, but you get the point. ; )

Anyway, back to the main idea. Let’s suppose something like Plato’s theory of pre-existence is at least possible. From there, imagine that God creates free-willing, intellectual souls—perhaps even an infinite number—initially in a state of perfect bliss and union with the divine. Further, suppose God offers these souls the opportunity to incarnate in various ways. Some of these opportunities involve incarnating in worlds with genuine indeterminism, where souls can actively shape these worlds, turning them into genuinely good places and experiencing certain goods—particularly relational ones—that wouldn’t otherwise be available since many of these goods logically depend on what unfolds within these worlds, including the negative states of affairs (classic “there can be no overcoming adversity without adversity” logic).

Incarnation, based on a pre-agreement, would naturally involve a certain “forgetting” (recall Plato’s epistemology of recollection) upon entering the world.¹

Additionally, since these worlds—possibly infinite in number—feature real indeterminism, the theist could incorporate the hypothesis of indifference commonly associated with naturalism, thereby neutralizing its predictive power while retaining what I think is the (far) greater predictive success of theism.² In other words, God creates worlds that seem indifferent to particular outcomes (including life itself)—because, in some real sense, they actually are—which enables the opportunities and goods associated with being true co-creators, world-builders, redeemers, etc.

However, this scenario would involve a primarily “hands-off” agreement from God—a non-interventionist policy. This would almost guarantee that many things wouldn’t go well and that many evils would appear (strongly) gratuitous.³ Yet, these are justified by:

1. The consent-based pre-agreement of entering such worlds.

2. The general (even if not absolute) non-interventionist policy, which is necessary to enable certain types of goods, particularly those related to virtue cultivation and relationship-building (empathy, compassion, self-sacrifice, heroism, courage, etc.).

Whatever the case, this theodicy allows for pithy responses to common objections:

• Why didn’t God create a world free of suffering? He did.

• Why didn’t God create a better world than this one? He did.

• Why did God thrust us into a world of suffering against our will? He didn’t.

The rest is in the details—important, to be sure—but anyone familiar with the theodicy literature can easily fill those in. As far as I can tell, this outline is compatible with any number of elements from the usual free-will, soul-building, soul-saving, or chaos-avoiding types of theodicies on offer. One can incorporate as many of those elements as they like to flesh it out further.

Remember, to defeat the logical problem of evil, there just has to be one possible state of affairs where the sufferings of this world are justified. While I don’t believe this account to be true—not even close—I do think it’s reasonable to see it as possible and as potentially justifying the evils we are tragically so familiar with.⁴

1. Depending on the incarnational form, we may also have inherently greater cognitive limitations for the duration of that existence. Consider something like Huxley’s theory of the brain as a “cognitive reducing valve” or a limiting mechanism, which could help explain stupid, irrational, or sinful actions.

2. Matthew Adelstein, with whom I’ve had some brief conversations about this theodicy (all idiotic ideas here are exclusively mine), makes a point like this in his response to the Problem of Evil:

Why There's Evil

3. Because randomness is used, intersections of causal lines may be viewed (from our perspective) as catastrophic, even gratuitous. But things always ultimately end up well, back with God; plus God works with his free creatures to make the best of the worlds they enter (insert greater goods theodicy here).

4. For what I think is the true theodicy, see my book The Best Argument for God.