9 Objections to the Cosmological Argument - REBUTTED
Cosmological reasoning encompasses a broad range of arguments that start from an observable fact of the natural world. These facts, combined with certain principles of causation or explanation, lead to a conclusion that supports theism.
For example, some cosmological arguments begin with the observation of contingency—that is, some things exist in a certain way but could have existed differently, or not at all. These arguments conclude that there must be at least one necessary being, based on principles like the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), as the fundamental ground of contingent reality.
Other arguments start with a detailed metaphysical analysis of everyday objects (such as corn, people, or Red 40) to eventually make a distinction between what these entities are (their essence) and that they exist (their existence). These arguments, often using a more restricted causal principle, then suggest that the mere existence of such entities implies there must be a being whose essence just is its existence (= God).
There are, as one might expect, variations within variations of cosmological arguments. So, naturally, this brief overview barely scratches the surface and cannot replace a thorough study of the topic. Consider this a cautionary note.
The key point for now is just that cosmological reasoning spans a wide spectrum, from Aristotle and Aquinas to Leibniz and Lonergan. Personally, I find some of these arguments quite compelling, others less so, and some leave me undecided. (I've developed my own take in 'The Best Argument for God'). Given the variety of arguments available, the most instructive approach for our purposes today is just to focus on specific objections and clarify which version of the cosmological argument they target, as not all criticisms apply universally.
Of course, addressing these objections comprehensively far exceeds the scope of a single article—especially one penned amidst sips of Old Grandad. Thus, the responses provided here are somewhat introductory, obviously gesturing toward more detailed elaborations that I believe decisively address the objection, even if not exhaustively. This is because many objections receive multiple, sometimes overlapping, rebuttals. While I explore these issues in depth in my book, I'll also recommend additional reading or watching for those wanting to go further.
Let’s begin.
God Can’t Exist. So, God Doesn’t Exist.
The objection I’m considering claims that a being like God (i.e., a necessary being) is impossible, thereby rendering the cosmological argument moot.
In response, I’m not aware of any convincing arguments that deem a necessary being impossible. Independent of cosmological arguments, there are, in fact, some decently persuasive reasons to accept the possibility of such a being (here’s a fantastic book on the subject), or at least, that’s where the weight of arguments tilts for me. But all that is not really to the point. Rather, this is: the cosmological argument's primary aim is to demonstrate that a being like God is not only possible but actual as the necessary condition for whatever fact of the world we’re considering. To just assert that God is impossible in the face of such argumentation is hardly a compelling rejoinder.
There’s another reason to consider the possibility of God as understood by many cosmological arguments: God’s absolute ontological simplicity. Consider this: boundaries—limitations of being, such as specific geometries—exclude realities from one another in the same comparative domain. For instance, the characteristics of a square preclude it from being a circle, hence the impossibility of square circles. God, devoid of any such limitations due to His utterly simple nature, and existing at the most foundational level of reality, could be compatible with anything, internal or external. If that’s right, this implies nothing could “block” God from reality; God is inherently compatible with all possibilities of being.1
Evil Exists. So, God Doesn’t.
A more promising avenue for the skeptic is not just to insist that God can’t exist but to argue that God is incompatible with some other obvious fact of experience. Here is where the objector is likely to venture the logical problem of evil.
Importantly, this objection, like the previous one, is not aimed at any of the steps along the way to the conclusion of the cosmological argument. Rather, it is directed at the conclusion itself, supposedly showing it to be absurd, indicating that something must be wrong with the cosmological argument even if we don’t see exactly what that is. Of course, if one could show that it is logically impossible for God to exist if evil occurs also, the theist would be in trouble.
To issue the briefest response, I will merely assert – as many atheistic philosophers already concede2 – that there is no currently successful formulation of the logical problem of evil (I would go further and contend that there cannot be a successful formulation, but I will save that argument for another time), hence why much of the debate has shifted toward evidential versions of the problem of evil.
What Caused God?
There are both naïve and subtle versions of this objection. The naïve version says this: If everything has a cause, then what caused God? The reason this objection is naïve is because no cosmological argument that I’m aware of runs from the explanatory commitment that everything has a cause. In fact, the cosmological argument is structured to conclude precisely the opposite, viz. that not everything has a cause, because not everything can have a cause.
To be more precise, the cosmological argument contends that certain types or categories of things are caused realities and without at least one uncaused reality there could be no entities of the caused sort. Once this misunderstanding is corrected for, the remaining question is simply this: If certain types of things are caused realities, then what sort of thing could be an uncaused reality? Different cosmological arguments work in different ways but many contend features that imply “being caused” include being contingent, composite, finite, changing, etc. If that’s right, then whatever the ultimate uncaused reality is, it must not be anything like those things. Which is to say, it must be necessary, simple, qualitatively infinite (unrestricted), immutable, etc.
As cosmological reasoners have contended, there is good reason to call a reality like that God since upon further analysis such an entity is shown to bear the traditional divine attributes (see Chapter 3 of my book for one way of conducting this analysis; Aquinas, as well.). So, the objection is ultimately confused since it is effectively asking, “What caused a reality that cannot conceivably be caused?” The answer is nothing, and that’s not a problem.
On the other hand, the sophisticated version understands the basic components of the cosmological argument but contends that there is actually nothing special, or special enough, about God that qualifies Him to be a better candidate for an uncaused necessary reality than some natural entity. For my response to the ‘What’s Good for the Theist Is Good for the Naturalist’ objection below.
Composition Fallacy. Cosmological arguments commit the fallacy of composition, illegitimately attributing some feature of the whole based on some or all of its members. For example, just because each part of an elephant may be light does not mean the elephant itself is light. Elephants are heavy! Similarly, just because each part of the universe is contingent, this does not mean the universe itself is contingent.3
There are at least two ways to respond to this criticism, depending on the cosmological argument under consideration. The first response simply emphasizes the obvious point that not all reasoning from parts to whole is, in fact, fallacious. Next, it argues that the cosmological argument deals with a property that naturally extends, or diffuses from, the parts to the whole. For example, if every brick in a wall is red, it is quite legitimate to conclude that the wall itself is red. So, one might argue that contingency is more akin to color than weight, particularly since there is no reason to think stacking or collecting dependent things would result in an independent whole.
Other forms as the cosmological argument, such as the Thomistic one, do not attempt to explain the universe in its entirety. Instead, they seek the necessary condition or set of conditions that allow any particular entity, whose essence is distinct from its existence, to exist at a particular moment. This approach sidesteps the composition concern entirely, nor does it rely on aggregating or making plural references.
Infinite Regress. Why suppose we must reach any sort of necessary reality and that we can’t explain everything through an infinite regress of contingent things? This contingent thing is explained by that contingent thing, etc., etc., ad infinitum?
Imagine an infinite line of dominoes, each one falling as a result of the one before it.4 Does this sequence explain everything? Most would argue, 'No, of course not,' because we would still want to know what supports these dominoes—in our analogy, a table. The critical insight here is that an infinite regress does not necessarily preclude or eliminate the need for a more fundamental explanation. This becomes particularly evident when considering an infinite regress or collection of contingent things and seeking an explanation for contingency itself. In such scenarios, any one contingent thing, whether part of an infinite series or not, merely presupposes the very concept needing explanation—contingency—which is hardly adequate.
The regress objection holds even less weight against Thomistic arguments, which distinguish between causally ordered series 'accidentally' and those ordered 'essentially.' For discussions on the difference this distinction makes, see Kerr, Shields, Feser, and my article Is Grounding Essentially Ordered Causation.
What’s Good for the Theist Is Good for the Naturalist. If the theist claims that God is a necessary reality, then the naturalist can just contend that something within the universe is a necessary reality. Or, if the theist says they can avoid brute facts by having God be an autonomous fact, then the naturalist can suggest similar by having some natural entity be an autonomous fact, where its real definition includes its existence and whatever properties it has. In other words, whatever is good for the theist concerning ultimate explanation is good for the naturalist!
Importantly, the theistic conclusion that God is a necessary, self-sufficient reality isn't arbitrary. Cosmological arguments, particularly Thomistic ones, suggest that the ultimate explanation must transcend certain categories, like metaphysical composition, to avoid contingency. Such arguments posit that the foundational reality must be ontologically simple—its essence just being its existence, or Existence Alone, as Aquinas described it. This specification rules out the possibility of declaring just any ol’ thing necessary or autonomous since it outlines the unique characteristics of an ontologically independent reality. Upon conceptual analysis, this metaphysically simple reality entails the divine attributes, which is sufficient to show that the principles supporting certain theistic arguments do not equally apply to naturalistic assertions.
Here is another way to come at this, once again from a Thomistic perspective. The theist does not – and definitely should not – say that God’s existence is a brute fact, which leaves the only acceptable option to be that God’s existence is self-explanatory, which certain skeptical thinkers have called indefensible. But is it indefensible? I think not, though we must clarify what is meant by self-explanatory from the Thomistic viewpoint. Again, recall that the Thomistic approach argues for a real distinction between the what-ness and is-ness for all individuals but one. That “but one” being not distinct from its existence would be simple (metaphysically uncomposed) and self-subsistent (exists in virtue of being its essence). This is to say that it is the nature (that is, what would be captured by its real definition if we had it) of the uncaused cause which explains why that being exists necessarily. Moreover, the question of “how can it be that Y exists” is only appropriately asked if some entity is really distinct from its existence. So, the fact that the uncaused cause is not really distinct from existence explains why that question need not be asked of it.
None of these considerations apply to a natural entity, unless that natural entity winds up having just the same features or lack thereof attributed to the uncaused cause of the cosmological argument. In which case, there is no substantial disagreement, but apparently just a terminological one, in which case the objector has simply failed to grasp that what they are calling the ultimate natural entity is not a natural entity at all, but God.
Whether one thinks such argument fail for other reasons is another matter, for what is relevant to this objection is that such arguments provide a principled stopping point for ultimate explanation, one that cannot be co-opted by the naturalist.
Why Suppose Everything Actually Has an Explanation? (Brute Fact Objection). Perhaps it is merely our inclination to believe that everything has an adequate explanation. But, seriously, why should we think reality aligns with this expectation? It's possible that the universe, or some aspect of it, simply exists without further explanation, no?
While I've defended the explanatory principle that runs many cosmological arguments in my book—the PSR, arguing it's a necessary condition for knowledge and rational belief—I'll not delve into those defenses now. Instead, I'll simply contend that it is highly rational to seek an explanation for phenomena that seem to demand one rather than to dismiss the need for explanation altogether, particularly when such dismissal seems arbitrary. If no explanation is conceivable, that's one matter; however, if a plausible explanation is well-motivated then it should be embraced under the modest principle of extending our explanations as far as possible—a principle that guides both philosophy and science. Indeed, the cosmological argument offers just that: a well-motivated ultimate explanation for the existence of certain entities that crucially seem to require an external cause for their inclusion in reality.
For bonus, consider Lloyd Gerson’s response to this objection: In essence, it's unconvincing for skeptics to merely suggest that, perhaps, some things simply lack explanation. After all, proponents of the cosmological argument have just provided an explanation. If objectors are unwilling to accept this explanation, it falls upon them to articulate what exactly is wrong with it, rather than to dismiss it outright.5
Existential Inertia.
The existential inertia (EI) objection targets traditional cosmological arguments which suggest that certain entities, despite not having begun to exist within time, still require a productive and sustaining cause due to their contingent nature. This objection is particularly pertinent to arguments in the Thomistic tradition.
Mortimer Adler explains existential inertia as follows: “I hold that something akin to the principle of inertia applies in the realm of existence, and leads us to reject the mediaeval view that the continuing existence of individual things needs the continuing action of an efficient cause.”6
Here, quickly, is what is wrong with the EI thesis: Inertia supposes a subject, but on the Thomistic view, existence is what supplies the subject. Said differently, the potency of the essence is actualized (actuality doesn’t fall into potency like a drop in a bucket), or drawn into actuality, by the source of actuality, apart from which there is no subject to go on existing whether or not something comes around to destroy it. So, there can be no existential inertia given the Thomistic metaphysical view of things.
For a detailed development of this response, see Kerr’s essay on EI in his collection of arguments for God.
There Is No Reason to Call the First Cause God".
The objection is naive, since virtually all cosmological arguments provide at least some justification for considering the first cause as transcending the physical universe, being extremely powerful, possessing intellect, etc. It's true that not every cosmological argument is sufficient to ascribe to this cause the full spectrum of attributes typically associated with the classical theist conception of God. However, some cosmological arguments, particularly those of Thomas Aquinas, definitely do. In general, the more detailed the metaphysical framework underlying a cosmological argument, the more nuanced and rich the derived conception of God. This is one of the reasons I favor Thomistic arguments. Although they presuppose a substantial metaphysical background, I view this not as a drawback but as an advantage because: 1) I believe these assumptions can be adequately defended, and 2) they are profoundly significant for establishing a truly robust monotheism — God as radically transcendent, uniquely unique, qualitatively unrestricted, absolutely simple, etc.
Conclusion
The cosmological argument has an enormously rich history, so, naturally, many objections remain. I have briefly addressed the objections that I believe warrant serious consideration here, but that is not to say there aren't other objections also deserving of attention. (I discuss more in my book, as I'm sure you're tired of hearing by now).
Ultimately, we should strive to find the best objections to every argument, since objections are argument testers. We shouldn’t want to cling to something that can break so easily — that is so flimsy and frail.
Over the years, I have abandoned many arguments and positions due to forceful objections, and I believe I am better for it. That being said, I have not abandoned the cosmological argument. It made a profound impression on me when I first encountered it, and my confidence in its resilience under rigorous scrutiny has only grown over time. While I am skeptical of many philosophical arguments, I am convinced that some versions of the cosmological argument are indeed successful.
Related Posts
Finally, if one worried about certain alleged paradoxes, for example, whether God can create a stone too heavy to lift, they should consider whether such a notion actually is a possibility of being or merely a trick of language. One might think a stone, by nature, is inherently liftable. If so, then God cannot create a stone too heavy to lite any more than God can create a squared-circle, but that is not a problem for omnipotence, since omnipotence properly conceived only refers to being able to produce all possibilities of being, not impossibilities.
See, for example, Oppy, G. R. 2017. “Logical Arguments from Evil and Free-Will Defences.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil.
This and other objections can sometimes be complicated by the debate over whether the universe just is the aggregate of all concretely existing individuals or whether it is some Single Big Thing itself. My personal view is the former, but the cosmological argument can accommodate either perspective.
I borrow this example from Joshua Rasmussen.
Gerson, Plotinus, 13.
Adler, How to Think About God, 124.