Skeptical Theism and Natural Theology

It has been objected that if skeptical theism works against the evidential problem of evil, it spells trouble for the theist in other areas — for example, in natural theology.

How so?

Skeptical theism suggests that God’s reasons (or the weight of God’s reasons, as the case may be) aren’t something we can make confident judgments about. Including the sorts of things God would permit with respect to suffering and evil.

The problem this is alleged to cause is fairly straightforward: Since much of natural theology makes use of appealing to the reasons God has to create, the skeptical theist would seem to render such appeals illegitimate.

The natural theological argument from fine-tuning is an immediate target of this objection, since theists generally suggest that God would be motivated to bring about life and given that God has the power to fine-tune a universe for life, well, there you go. The discovery of fine-tuning thereby counts as strong confirmation of theism, since this phenomena is hardly expected if God does not exist (I’m omitting details, of course. For more, see my book The Best Argument for God). The problem, of course, is that appealing to God’s motives is appealing to the sort of thing the skeptical theist would seem to be saying we are actually in the dark about. On the face, these projects — skeptical theism, on the one hand, and natural theology, on the other — appear incompatible.

The question for the natural theologian inclining toward skeptical theism, is this: If we are in the dark about the (weight of) reasons God might have for permitting evil states of affairs, then how are we not in the dark more generally? What stops the matter – all matters, really, concerning divine action – from being inscrutable?

In other words, if we put skeptical theism up, must we take natural theology down? If so, is that a worthwhile trade? Might it not be better to take the evidential hit from evil, assuming there is no workable theodicy (which I take to be false, but set that aside), and just counter with the positive arguments for God?

While I do not personally advance skeptical theism ( again, TBAFG for my preferred theodicy), I would say the objection above has only limited force, at least once we distinguish between approaches in natural theology. If, indeed, we are in the dark about God’s reasons, this would, at most or at worst, undermine arguments in natural theology that rely on inference to the best explanation, which frequently appeal to God’s reasons and weight thereof.  However, the more traditional arguments for God – the metaphysical demonstrations, if you will – do not work like this. Rather, those arguments search out the necessary causal conditions for various commonsense phenomena – change, contingency, compositeness, etc. – and move through a strict logical chain to a reality bearing the traditional divine attributes – immutable, necessary, simple, etc. Those arguments would be quite unscathed by the advance of skeptical theism, since they do not require any reliance upon discerning the sorts of reasons God might have for creating or doing things a certain way.

This means if someone is a theist who prefers the more traditional approach to natural theology, skeptical theism could serve as an effective rejoinder to the evidential argument of evil without the cost of sawing off positive support for the position they are seeking to defend. On the other hand, the theist who prefers the more contemporary approach to natural theology, whereby appealing to God’s reasons is necessary for the project, should perhaps be wary of utilizing skeptical theism in response to arguments from evil.

I say perhaps, because skeptical theists have some clever responses worth considering on this score. Those, we shall query another time.