Rasmussen on Omnipotence
Joshua Rasmussen of
offers the following observation about Omnipotence:https://twitter.com/worldviewdesign/status/1692223593067970865
“Restricting God's powers to the *logically possible* does not answer the paradox of omnipotence but concedes the conclusion: the concept of having all powers *without restriction* is logically impossible.”
One immediate thought is just that there is no such thing as power to produce contradiction, since power relates only to what is producible and contradictions are not. Thus the restriction of omnipotence to what is logically possible is really a conceptual refinement against the workings of our imagination (which James Ross calls the master of falsity).
Either way, I’ve always liked the traditional understanding that omnipotence relates just to what is inherently producible (not that God can do anything, like swim in a lake of cheese), of which logic is just one constraint. For example, I don’t think unjustified evil (whatever that may be… God creating one burning turtle for all eternity and nothing else?) is producible since the landscape of what God can produce is constrained by his perfect goodness, rationality, etc., since everything, including God, acts according to its nature. Moreover, on the doctrine of divine simplicity, God just is his justice (going further, God is Justice itself, just as God is goodness itself, being itself, etc.), and because of this philosophers have hinted at the apparently contradictory implication of Justice itself producing ultimately unjust states. In other words, perhaps the metaphysical and logical constraints are more deeply interrelated than one initially suspects.
Maybe Josh would endorse an account of omnipotence like this himself, especially since it seems to connect well with his thesis of modal continuity — i.e., we should think that some conceivable thing or state of affairs is possible insofar as it is like some other thing or state of affairs we know is possible (perhaps because actual) unless there is some relevant difference to think otherwise. Quoting Josh, “Statements that differ by a mere quantitative term don’t normally differ with respect to being possibly true.”
For example, if thirteen turtles is possible for God to produce we should think it is possible for God to produce fourteen turtles, because there seems to be no relevant difference that should constrain the possibility space just to thirteen turtles. However, it is not implausible to think differences concerning value or disvalue might well provide a relevant difference concerning what is producible and that this finds ultimate explanation within the nature of God.
Justt something to think about. Thanks to Josh for stimulating this.