Is Theism Simpler Than Naturalism?
Simplicity is a complicated philosophical topic, ironically. Whether we are discussing divine simplicity, which is the claim that God has no distinctions that amount to real ontological composition, or simplicity as it relates to a criteria of theory selection among worldview competitors, the waters are deep and difficult to wade through. (Of course, I attempt to wade through both in my book.).
For now, I want to focus on the latter notion of simplicity, in response to the following question that somebody brought up on this week’s livestream.
User Hrastko wrote: “… could you explain how the simplicity criteria when evaluating theories implies theism?”
The reason for having various criteria for theory selection is simply because, as we know, data can be explained by a range of mutually exclusive theories. So a theory just being explanatorily adequate is often not enough to select it as being true or even just probably true.
For example, my driveway being wet could be caused by my sprinkler turning on (sprinkler hypothesis) or twenty birds flying past which all simultaneously spit (bird hypothesis). In both cases, we would have a causally adequate explanation for the phenomena of my wet driveway, but instinctively we think the sprinkler hypothesis is more plausible. Why? Because, even just intuitively, we see it as being simpler and because of that internally more likely.
Simplicity, then, as a criteria, is an “other things” equal criteria and when it comes to worldview comparison the “other thing” generally being explanatory comprehensiveness. So in other words, if two theories explain the relevant stuff equally well, we think simplicity can then be the theoretical tiebreaker. The basic idea is that the fewer moving components something has, the fewer ways something can go wrong (that is, turn out to be false). More complex theories are taken to be internally less likely to be true, as a matter of probability. That’s the general picture, anyway.
Now, on one understanding, theism might be seen to be obviously more complex than naturalism. At least, that is, if you think theism is just everything the naturalist believes plus the existence of God. From this perspective, it seems that (minimally) the theist is committed to one additional thing that the naturalist is not, and so loses out on the criteria of simplicity.
However, this understanding is naïve. First, the criteria of simplicity, at least when it comes to worldview comparison, is ultimately focused on how simple the fundamental aspect of the theory is (the fundamental layer, entity, or what have you). Whatever results from the fundamental thing is not hugely relevant. In other words, for worldview comparison, the virtue of simplicity is restricted to The Fundamental (entities, kinds, notions, etc.).
Here is a simple thought experiment to motivate this position, adopted from Sijuwade. Imagine Bob 1 is a metaphysician that posits 100 fundamental entities. His theory is seen to be excellent and is widely adopted by metaphysicians in his community. A littler later, Bob 2 is a metaphysical that can posit 10 lower-level entities that in various combination result in the 100 (previously considered fundamental) entities that Bob 1 posited.
In this case, most would not only think genuine progress was made by Bob 2 but that it also resulted in an overall simpler theory, even though it resulted in there being more entities overall. (Notice, as well, that Bob 2 believes in everything Bob 1 believed in, and more, just like, as is commonly asserted, the theist believes in everything the naturalist does, and more). Why? Because the root, if you will, is simpler, since there are less basic components. Bob 2 thus has a theory that is not only explanatorily superior but more elegant, economical, etc.
Once this is understood, it is not altogether difficult to see how classical theism may be superior to metaphysical naturalism with regards to simplicity. Without God at the root, the naturalist must (to exclude God) posit fundamentalia that are not perfect or qualitatively unbounded – thus, they will be restricted in some sense or another, with arbitrary boundaries/complexity. Some naturalists are pluralists, as well, with many fundamental entities. But even monists will still have some fundamental entity that is, at least when compared to God, more complex insofar as it will require more information to explain its basic contours.
As I argue in the book, as well, any natural entity itself will be a brute fact – something seeming to require deeper explanation but cannot (within the naturalistic framework) find one. My overarching claim, then, is not only is naturalism more complex concerning The Fundamental but that it also fails to explain everything that needs to be explained.
- Pat
Related: Rasmussen has a recent post looking at how theism’s simplicity gives it a great probability out of the gate.
This is another attempt to find the explanation that requires the fewest steps to explain reality.
Are brute facts just necessary conditions for the universe's existence, or are they the result of some unknown series of causes by the creator of the universe? Wouldn't it be simpler for the creator to create the brute fact than to make some yet unknown process that leads to the brute fact?
------------------
Person B believes an entity created the things that exist and the laws of interaction. This is a straightforward explanation that answers the question of why things exist. However, it doesn't answer the question of the origin of this entity.
Why should anyone accept that some entity created everything we see, the physical things, the laws of the physical universe that govern the behavior of physical things? Then, there are many new findings of seemingly immaterial things, such as the Quantum World, that interact with the physical universe and possibly create new physical things. Our world is highly complicated.
Where did all these very complicated things come from? Person A says they always existed in some form or popped into existence out of nothing. But we have seen that this is nonsense. Infinite regress leads to absurdities, and popping out of nothing is even more absurd.
So, what is the basis for Person B's beliefs? It is logic!
Our total reality has many physical sub-realities, nearly all with a cause we can identify. We may not know all the causes of each reality, but there are none that we can say have no reason for being. Some realities seem to be a given, and we will return to these below.
We are used to nearly every entity in our reality having a chain of events that led to its existence. Our parents led to our birth. A tree results from a seed, water, fertile soil, and the proper temperatures. The dust in interstellar space, along with gravity and the characteristics of these dust particles, has led to the formation of stars. Other forms of interstellar dust have led to the formation of planets and asteroids. This dust which are mainly elements and small molecules are the result of the Big Bang or the explosion of stars.
Each entity has a history of previous states that caused its current form. However, all these previous states (n, n1, n2, n3, etc.) also had a series of causes or previous states that led to their existence. It's what we see all around us.
Because this series of states can not be due to an infinite number of steps, there had to be a beginning. However, the closer we get to the start of a series of events, the harder it is to explain all its causes.
Each series of steps must have a first step that causes the next step in the chain. The best analogous illustration of this is a long chain of dominos, each causing the next in line to fall. For example, we point to every part of our universe, and nearly everything has a string of causes originating at the universe's beginning.
Remember, we are trying to explain why anything exists and exists in a very complicated and precise way. But what caused this first step to exist? What pushed the first domino?
The only answer is that this first step is self-existent. Part of its essence is to exist. We have never seen such an entity, but it must exist if anything exists. Person B cannot explain such an entity other than it just exists.
For now, we will not call this entity God, but that is what most people in history have called it. One thing we can say now is that it must be self-existent. This sounds as far-fetched as anything the atheist claims, but is it? There is a famous Sherlock Holmes quote, "when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?"
We will also not discuss any characteristics of this initial cause except that besides being self-caused, it has the power to cause other entities. This means it has to be intelligent and powerful.
As mentioned above, as this series of causes approaches its beginning, it becomes more difficult to explain them. For example, the universe has some exact physical constants, such as the speed of light, the gravitational constant, the amount and distribution of fundamental particles at the beginning, etc, and some very exact laws.
We have no explanation for these constants and laws other than they are just as they are. But these constants and laws seem very peculiar. If they deviated even a little bit from what they are, there would be no universe or any universe where we could exist. So even if these constants and laws have a set of causes that lead to them or they just exist, are they the result of some act of this initial entity that brought them into being because they are necessary?
Something that gets at the simplicity argument - Robert Spitzer's book on God.
"Science at the Doorstep to God: Science and Reason in Support of God, the Soul, and Life after Death"
The first part is a lot more than just proof of God using science. For example, I was listening to it yesterday while walking, and I said it was proof of free will. How?
The evidence for the existence of a creator is not just compelling, it's overwhelming. To dismiss it as a highly probable explanation is to ignore the facts. Yet, even among our most intelligent sub-groups, there are those who deny it. They would be forced to acknowledge it if there was no free will. But they resist, using all their mental capabilities. This resistance can only be explained by the presence of free will.
Some of the rationales proposed by atheists for the complexities of the real world are not just complicated, they are convoluted. This not only makes atheism seem absurd, but it also reveals the inherent complexity in their arguments.
Score one for Aquinas.
Spritzer is a Jesuit, one of the few I defend.
From the book on its proof of God: "An explanation of the simplicity of the one unrestricted reality and a response to Dawkins." I haven't got to it yet, but it is a section title later in the book.
Another comparison between naturalism and theism is the commission of the fallacy of begging the question. That is assuming something without proof. Theists beg the question when they conclude that an extra reality intellect is the inference to the best solution for existence. Materialism begs the question for all their explanations for a material-only existence, including one they definitely cannot prove, that there is no trans-reality entity that created the universe. Science fails to confirm this. If they were honest, they would have to admit this.
So atheists are also dishonest as well as having free will. They are freely dishonest.