Is Necessity an Explanation Ender?

Sometimes, it is hard to see how.

If an explanation is supposed to remove mystery, then appealing to necessity does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation in many instances. In fact, the declaration of something being necessary often seems to raise more questions than it answers. Plus, it’s clear that certain things or truths that are necessary have further explanation: in fact, we routinely seek explanations for necessary truths—this is the essence of mathematics, after all.

All to say, it doesn’t seem right that even if something is necessary, no further explanation can be given.

Take certain moral truths that some philosophers argue are explained simply because they are necessary. Consider the statement, "It is always wrong to humiliate old women for pleasure." This appears to be a plausible moral truth, yet it clearly invites further inquiry, especially since it is neither analytic nor tautological. Why does this moral truth hold? What grounds it? To respond that it is necessary only deepens the mystery, so far as I can tell. Because now we are left wondering not only why this moral truth holds but also why it must hold (in all possible worlds, if you will).

Or consider the claim that God is a necessary being and therefore does not require further explanation or cause. This seems problematic. If that is all we have said about God, we surely want to know not only why God exists but also why God must exist. Mystery is multiplied, not removed.

Here’s where I think a better account lies: essentialism.

For example, moral truths hold—and must hold—because they are somehow bound up with the essence (or what it is to be) of something. For example, an Aristotelian might contend that it is always wrong to humiliate old women for pleasure because, given our human nature, such actions are inherently vicious and frustrate our flourishing as rational-social animals. Since we naturally desire to flourish, we ought to act in ways that align with the dictates of the natural law. Moreover, since the essence of something cannot be altered without it ceasing to be what it is, an essentialist explanation can account for strong notions of necessity. (If Aristotelianism is not to one’s liking, then consider the essentialist approach offered in The Moral Universe.)

The same reasoning applies to God: classically, God is the one being whose essence is not really distinct from His existence. It is simply God's nature—or essence—to exist. Given this nature, God could not not exist. As Christophe de Ray recently put it, "Existence exists, and it is God." This perspective not only explains God’s ontological independence but also His unique necessity. Of course, this requires a particular metaphysical framework—one where existence is a real, first-level property of concrete individuals. But if this metaphysic is well-supported (spoiler: I think it is), an essentialist explanation works well here. Bonus: it allows us to conceptually analyze the notion of a being whose essence is its existence and to derive the traditional suite of divine attributes, as I explore in my book. Such analysis also reveals why no finite, physical entity could possess the kind of necessity required for ontological independence.