Evil as an Obstacle for Naturalism?
Imagine two competitors in an Obstacle Course Race, where the final obstacle involves lifting a heavy stone and placing it upon a pedestal. However, before attempting the stone lift the competitors must clear several prior obstacles. If the prior obstacles are not cleared (or cleared quickly enough) the latter obstacles cannot be attempted. Prior to the stone lift are the following obstacles: running through a thick mud pit, climbing up a peg wall, crawling under an electric fence, jumping between platforms hovering above water, and swimming across a 500m lake.
Competitor 1 has considerable upper body strength but is substantially overweight, unable to swim, in poor cardiovascular condition, and is missing a leg. Competitor 2 has been an athlete their entire life – swims great, runs fast, leaps well, etc. – but doesn’t look especially muscular. We then learn one of the competitors has just completed the obstacle course. Which do we believe it is?
Almost certainly, we think Competitor 2 is the victor. Why? Well, because even if we think Competitor 2 is less likely to lift the stone than Competitor 1, we know lifting the stone entails having completed the prior obstacles, and when considering the prior obstacles, we know Competitor 1 is far less likely to complete those obstacles than Competitor 2. In fact, some of the prior obstacles may be impossible for Competitor 1 to complete, such as the swimming or jumping portions. Given this is the case, then even if we think Competitor 2 might struggle to lift the stone, so long as we don’t believe it is impossible for Competitor 2 to lift the stone, we confidently assume Competitor won the Obstacle Course Race.
This is like the theism and atheism debate concerning evil. Even if we don’t believe there is a high likelihood that God would explain (permit) the evil and suffering we experience, it may be the case that mindless naturalism cannot even clear the conditions necessary for evil to occur in the first place, thus knocking it out of the competition altogether. Considered just in itself, The Hypothesis of Indifference (which runs naturalism) may not have difficulty explaining evil once certain conditions are already in place, just as Competitor 2 may not have much difficulty lifting the stone once the prior obstacles have already been cleared. However, mindless naturalism must itself clear several obstacles before the occurrence of evil is a real possibility – obstacles which are either really difficult or impossible for naturalism to clear.
For example, before Naturalism has a chance to explain the occurrence of evil, it must explain: why any concrete-causally capable entity exists, why consciousness exists, why rationality exists, why moral principles exist, and why the universe is fine-tuned for intelligent, interactive life. These are obstacles on the way to evil. If these hurdles cannot be cleared, then evil (as we experience it) cannot occur.
Some of these obstacles may just be a significant struggle for naturalism, but still possible (however extremely improbable) to overcome, like fine-tuning. However, I suggest some of these obstacles are actually impossible for mindless naturalism, even more so than a one-legged, overweight obstacle course competitor that can’t swim getting to the stone-lift.
The point is this. Once we widen the scope of entailments concerning the datum of evil, it becomes clear that evil is better expected — and therefore confirms — theism. This becomes even more obvious once we see that theism does not produce a low expectation of evil but one that is (at least) moderately high.
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