Does the Contingency Argument Commit the Fallacy of Composition?

It is often said the contingency argument commits the fallacy of composition by assuming something is true of the whole on the basis of its members: i.e., that the universe as a whole is contingent because its members are, hence it requires an extrinsic cause. But, the skeptic objects, it is simply not the case that the whole inherits every and all properties of its parts. For example, just because the parts of some object are light (in weight) does not necessarily mean the object itself is light.   

There are several ways of handling this objection. The first is to highlight the fact that not all parts-to-whole reasoning is fallacious, as logicians recognize. I.e., noting that every brick in the wall is red allows for the inference that the wall itself is red. Of course, this does not show that contingency arguments do not commit the fallacy of composition; however, it does show they do not automatically commit the fallacy of composition and cannot be so easily dismissed.

From here, there are several options for getting the argument back up and running. I’ll list them briefly:

·        Argue that contingency is a diffusive property and whole-inherited. That is, that contingency is more like color than weight such that contingent things do not (in fact, cannot) sum to anything less than contingent. Further, that this would be true when thinking either of existential contingency or modal contingency. From there, argue that if the universe is nothing over and above its members, then the universe is contingent.

·        Argue that if the universe is nothing over and above its members, then the universe is contingent because… if The Universe is the totality of its member, then if The Universe has no members the Universe does not exist. Stated differently, the Universe’s existence depends upon the existence of its members. At which point there is some possible world in which there are no contingent beings. Which is to say there is some possible world where The Universe has no members. Which is to say there is some possible world where The Universe does not exist. Which is to say The Universe is contingent.  

·        Argue that if the universe is a distinct entity from its members, then it must either be existentially contingent or not (exhaustive coverage).  

·        If it is existentially contingent, then it definitionally requires an extrinsic cause. If not, then it is either necessary or a modally contingent brute fact.

·        If it is necessary, then stage 1 of the contingency argument has been conceded: there is at least one necessary (concrete) being. If it is a modally contingent brute fact, then the universe is nevertheless contingent, even if it has yet been demonstrated that everything modally contingent requires a cause. That’s where considerations of explanatory principles (like PSR) kick in.

From the considerations above, it seems the advocate of the contingency argument is on solid ground against the charge of composition fallacy.