Do Classical Theists and Theistic Personalists Believe In The Same God?

In his An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion, Brian Davies helpfully charts the differences between classical theism and theistic personalism.

Classical Theism: There is only one God. God creates. God is simple. God is not a being among beings. God is non-material. God knows and loves. God knows all that has been and will be. God is active in all that happens. God does not undergo change. God is outside time. God is not causally affected by creatures. God is seriously incomprehensible.

Theistic Personalism: There is only one God. God creates. God is not simple. God is a being among beings. God is non-material. God knows and loves. God might not know all that will be. God sometimes stands back and permits things to happen. God undergoes change. God is not outside time. God is causally affected by creatures. God is seriously comprehensible.

Davies afterwards raises the question of whether classical theists and theistic personalists can be said to believe in the same God (as well, whether Christians, Muslims, and Jews can be said to believe in the same God).

Ultimately, Davies says that if the differences between classical theists are serious and irreconcilable, then they do believe in the same God. But are the differences serious and irreconcilable? Davies leaves the questions open.

My position is that the differences are, in fact, serious and irreconcilable. Surely, it would be quite absurd to claim that the person who believes God is ontologically simple and immutable believes in the same God as the person who believes God is ontologically complex and changing. Such people no more believe in the same God as two people wondering if they have a mutual acquaintance, one of whom describes as deaf and short as of five minutes ago and the other describes as great of hearing and tall as of five minutes ago, are thinking of the same person. The answer, quite obviously, is they do not have a mutual acquaintance, at least not that one.