Brute Facts and Resistant Belief

The problem of divine hiddenness relies on “non-resistant non-belief”, or somebody who would believe in God if only for the evidence. They aren’t renitent to believing in God (or so they say); they just they find themselves unable. Why would God allow this?

Observation: There are people who claim non-resistant non-belief but object to cosmological arguments for God by invoking brute facts. In other words, when effect to cause reasoning demands contingent facts find their ultimate explanation in a purely actual, Supreme being, skeptics (some, anyway) abandon — seemingly arbitrarily — their commitment to intelligibility and say, “Why think everything needs an explanation?”

Here is what I wonder. Does somebody who summons brute facts to escape cosmological arguments for the existence of God — given how contrived the maneuver is — can that person claim non-resistant non-belief? Does rejection of the Principle of Sufficient Reason reveal a person’s (if only implicit) resistance to God?

The problem is this. On the one hand, the skeptic demands there must be some reason for why God allows them to persist in non-belief. On the other hand, they demand there needn’t be a reason for why anything contingent thing exists instead of nothing.

It seems inconsistent.