4 Solutions to the Problem of Evil
Atheists say the problem of evil disconfirms theism. The idea is the suffering we encounter in this world is far more probable if God did not exist. There are (at least) four solutions to this theistic challenge, as I see it:
Argue God is a matter of metaphysical necessity, thus suffering and God must be compatible, because both are actual. Here one is privileging metaphysical demonstration over cumulative case apologetics. Ed Feser takes this approach in 5 Proofs.
Argue it is a category mistake to assume God has obligations to creation or that God is a moral agent like we (as human beings) are moral agents. See The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil by Brian Davies; also, Feser’s exposition in Religions.
Argue PoE is NOT as expected on mindless naturalism as it may initially seem — and, in fact, is better expected on theism (even if not highly expected). I’ve argued this a number of times (clarification here). Josh Rasmussen makes a similar move toward the end of How Reason Can Lead to God. Finally, Jim Madden makes the point, contra Draper, than even the qualitative experience of pain is better expected on theism than atheism.
Argue PoE actually is highly expected, if not entailed, by theism, given a certain understanding of God (including how theism entails an afterlife), creation, and the human person. An example of this would be Dougherty’s book on animal suffering. Eleonore Stump’s magisterial Wandering In Darkness makes a similar case, though focusing more on adult humans.
Obviously, these approaches are compatible. In fact, I think they are all (with qualification), true.
One could first maintain that we should privilege metaphysical arguments for God than evidential arguments from evil against because the former are clearer to reason. I think that’s right.
From there, one could, following Davies, maintain God is the creator of the natural moral law, just as he is the creator of the law of thermodynamics, and no more subject to the former than the latter, for obvious reasons. I think that is right, as well.
Next, the theist could argue that the conditions for the possibility of PoE (consciousness-rational agents, fine-tuned & contingent universe, moral principles, moral knowledge, and the integration/linking of these components, etc.) are so enormously low on mindless naturalism that PoE itself is enormously low, if not virtually impossible, absent God’s existence. The more I’ve thought about it, the more right this seems: If God did not exist, I would not expect the PoE. Certainly, I would not expect anybody to experience evil while judging it as such.
Finally, one could pick up from Dougherty and Stump and maintain — consistently with the fact God doesn’t have moral obligations like we do — that God’s rationality, the nature of a material universe, the nature of human agency, etc., shows 1) that suffering of the sort we experience is highly expected by God’s existence, and 2) this gives reason to suspect this phase of our life is transitional and developmental.
- Pat
Good post